Russia’s position on who should participate in international weapons discussions has become a significant point of tension as governments gather in Geneva to decide what comes next for lethal autonomous weapons. The United Nations’ Seventh Review Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), running from Nov. 16 to 20, has already encountered a procedural deadlock before delegates could formally advance their work.
The immediate problem is not simply disagreement over whether autonomous weapons should be banned. It is also about the rules governing the negotiations, including the participation of observers and how governments will conduct discussions on a possible international agreement.
The stakes are considerable. These weapons can be designed to identify, select and engage targets without a human operator intervening in those tasks. The question confronting governments is whether existing international law provides sufficient safeguards—or whether a new legally binding agreement is needed before autonomous targeting becomes more widespread.
The conference’s second meeting on Nov. 16 ended without an agreed way to proceed formally. Its presiding officer said consultations had failed to produce agreement and described the situation as a procedural impasse. Russia’s delegate subsequently expressed support for efforts to resolve the deadlock but asked whether planned informal discussions on autonomous weapons would be held without United Nations broadcasting. UN Transcripts
Russia’s Observer Position Has Been a Dispute Before the Conference
The procedural disagreement did not emerge without background.
During the preparatory committee meeting on Sept. 7, Russia raised objections concerning the participation of non-governmental organisations and other observers in CCW proceedings.
In its intervention, the Russian delegation argued that observer participation should not automatically include the right to speak during plenary sessions. It also called for restrictions on observer statements and working documents, saying these should remain within the organisations’ areas of expertise and avoid what Moscow characterised as politicised accusations against states.
Russia said it was not opposed to non-governmental participation altogether, but wanted observers’ activities limited to technical and constructive contributions. UN Transcripts
That position is relevant to the current dispute because observers can include humanitarian organisations, research institutions and civil society groups that contribute expertise on the consequences of weapons development and use.
However, the available conference record does not establish that Russia alone caused the Nov. 16 impasse. The conference president confirmed that a procedural disagreement remained unresolved, while Russia publicly expressed support for finding a way forward.
The distinction matters: documenting a government’s previous position is not the same as proving that it was solely responsible for a later breakdown in negotiations.
What the UN Means by Killer Robots
The term “killer robots” is commonly used in public debate, but it is not a formal legal classification.
The United Nations uses the term lethal autonomous weapon systems, or LAWS. Its 2026 working description focuses on systems capable of identifying, selecting and engaging targets without intervention by a human operator in carrying out those functions.
This definition is important because not every military drone or automated weapon qualifies.
A remotely piloted aircraft, for example, may use sophisticated navigation and targeting assistance while leaving the final decision to attack with a human operator. The presence of artificial intelligence does not automatically make a weapon autonomous.
The UN also explains that autonomy is a function rather than a particular type of military platform. The relevant questions concern what a weapon can do, how it is configured and deployed, and what human judgement and control remain in the process. United Nations
The distinction is increasingly important as armed forces introduce more automated systems. WWC ONE MEDIA has examined this shift in its report on Singapore’s automated artillery and precision-strike systems, which illustrates how automation can speed up military operations without necessarily transferring every decision to a machine.
The Negotiating Proposal Already Has a Foundation
The Geneva conference is not starting from zero.
The Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, established under the CCW, spent several years examining the legal, humanitarian, technological and security implications of these systems.
In 2026, the group reached consensus on a set of elements for an instrument addressing autonomous weapons, without prejudging the instrument’s final legal form. The work provides governments with a foundation for deciding whether to begin negotiations and what issues those negotiations should cover. docs-library.unoda.org+1
A separate proposal submitted to the UN General Assembly’s First Committee on Oct. 13 gives a clearer indication of the direction sought by countries supporting negotiations.
The draft resolution, A/C.1/81/L.37, was submitted by 21 countries, including the Philippines. It calls on the High Contracting Parties to the CCW to advance to negotiations on an instrument on lethal autonomous weapons systems, building on the elements developed by the expert group.
It also reaffirms that international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law, applies to autonomous weapons. Digital Library
This is significant for the Philippines. Its participation as a co-sponsor places Manila among the governments seeking to move the discussion beyond expert-level deliberations and towards formal negotiations.
The draft resolution is not itself a completed treaty. It expresses a proposed course of action and still needs to proceed through the General Assembly’s decision-making process.
Why Human Control Is at the Centre of the Debate
The core issue is accountability.
When a human operator selects a target and authorises an attack, responsibility can be examined through the decisions made by the people and institutions involved. Autonomous systems raise more difficult questions when software performs target identification and engagement without intervention at the moment those actions occur.
That does not mean machines are legally responsible in place of people. International humanitarian law continues to impose obligations on states and parties to armed conflict, including those developing, deploying and using weapons.
The challenge is ensuring that human responsibility remains meaningful when systems operate with increasing independence.
The International Committee of the Red Cross has called for a legally binding instrument that would prohibit certain autonomous weapons, including systems designed to target humans directly and those whose effects cannot be adequately understood or controlled. It has also proposed restrictions on other autonomous weapons, including limits on the targets, circumstances and duration of their use. International Committee of the Red Cross+1
The risks are not limited to autonomous weapons making incorrect decisions. They also include the possibility that rapid automated operations could leave people with insufficient time or information to assess whether an attack complies with international law.
WWC ONE MEDIA previously examined a reported case involving an AI-assisted intelligence assessment that nearly led US forces towards an erroneous operation involving a Chinese vessel. That episode concerned an alleged error in human intelligence analysis, not an autonomous weapon. It nevertheless illustrates why verification and human oversight matter when technology influences decisions involving military force.
The debate is also relevant to the wider development of weapons using advanced guidance and automation, including systems discussed in WWC’s report on North Korea’s high-speed torpedo programme. The precise capabilities of such systems must be assessed individually rather than assuming that every AI-related military claim describes a fully autonomous weapon.
Why the Current Legal Framework Is Not the Final Answer
There is currently no specific legally binding international instrument dedicated to regulating autonomous weapon systems.
That does not mean these weapons operate outside international law. The UN has made clear that existing international humanitarian law applies to all weapons, including those incorporating autonomous functions.
The legal principles governing armed conflict include distinction between civilians and combatants, proportionality in attacks and precautions to protect civilians. The challenge is applying those obligations to systems whose decisions may be generated through complex automated processes.
The CCW offers a framework for governments to negotiate restrictions on particular categories of conventional weapons. Its existing protocols cover issues including non-detectable fragments, mines and booby-traps, incendiary weapons, blinding laser weapons and explosive remnants of war.
A new protocol or another international instrument could establish more specific rules for autonomous weapons. But governments still disagree on the scope, legal form and timing of any future agreement. United Nations+1
For the Philippines and other countries with limited resources for military research and development, the eventual rules could also influence procurement standards, military training and the safeguards expected when acquiring automated defence technologies.
What Happens Next?
The Seventh Review Conference is scheduled to run until Nov. 20, 2026. The immediate task is to resolve the procedural disagreement so delegates can conduct formal proceedings and consider the future mandate for work on autonomous weapons.
The conference president has already arranged consultations on the issue of lethal autonomous weapons, inviting interested delegations to participate. The meeting record indicates that the planned discussions would hear from High Contracting Parties before observers. UN Transcripts
The larger decision is whether governments can agree to begin negotiations on a new instrument and, if so, what its scope should be.
The Philippines is among the countries supporting a move towards negotiations. Russia’s previously stated concerns about observer participation and its position on the timing of restrictions remain relevant to the diplomatic debate, but the outcome will depend on the positions of all participating states.
The central question is no longer whether autonomous weapons deserve international attention. Governments have spent years examining the issue and have already produced a foundation for further work.
What remains uncertain is whether they can agree on rules before technological developments make meaningful limits more difficult to establish.
Frequently Asked Questions
1. What are killer robots?
“Killer robots” is an informal term for lethal autonomous weapon systems. These are systems capable of identifying, selecting and engaging targets without human intervention in carrying out those functions.
2. Did Russia block the UN conference on autonomous weapons?
The conference encountered a procedural impasse on Nov. 16, and Russia had previously called for restrictions on how observers participate. However, the available meeting record does not establish that Russia alone caused the deadlock.
3. Are autonomous weapons already illegal under international law?
There is no specific legally binding international instrument dedicated to autonomous weapons. However, existing international humanitarian law applies to their development and use.
4. Does the Philippines support negotiations on autonomous weapons?
Yes. The Philippines was among the 21 countries that co-sponsored the Oct. 13, 2026, draft General Assembly resolution calling for negotiations on an instrument addressing lethal autonomous weapons systems.
5. What happens if countries agree to negotiate a treaty?
Governments would need to negotiate the instrument’s scope, prohibitions, restrictions and implementation arrangements. A decision to begin negotiations would not immediately create a new treaty or make the proposed rules legally binding.
