KYIV — Ukraine is moving closer to a nationwide 5G rollout, but a regulatory gap over high-risk telecom suppliers is raising concerns that Chinese technology companies could find an opening in the country’s next-generation mobile networks.
The issue has become increasingly sensitive as Ukraine prepares to expand 5G while fighting a war in which communications infrastructure is itself a strategic target.
Ukraine’s telecom regulator has already established a new procedure for competitive tenders and auctions for radio-frequency spectrum. The rules were approved in February 2026 and subsequently registered with the Justice Ministry, creating a formal framework for future spectrum competitions.
But critics argue that awarding spectrum and securing the equipment that eventually operates the network are two different questions—and Ukraine still needs stronger, explicit safeguards governing high-risk suppliers.
The China question hanging over Ukraine’s 5G rollout
The concern centers largely on Chinese telecom equipment manufacturers such as Huawei and ZTE, which have faced restrictions or heightened scrutiny in the United States and several European countries over national-security and cybersecurity concerns.
Ukraine has not imposed the same comprehensive restrictions on Chinese telecom equipment that some Western countries have adopted.
An assessment published through the EU’s Ukraine-related policy framework noted that Kyiv had committed to developing 5G security rules aligned with the EU’s 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox, including the exclusion of high-risk suppliers.
But the assessment also said Ukraine had made limited progress implementing those commitments. It specifically pointed to a 5G pilot in Lviv where a licence was granted to a supplier considered high-risk under the EU framework.
That is why the upcoming auction has attracted attention beyond the telecommunications industry.
Why the legal gap matters
The problem is not simply whether a Chinese company can bid for spectrum.
Spectrum licences determine who can use valuable radio frequencies. The equipment question comes afterward, when operators build radio-access networks, core systems and other infrastructure.
Critics therefore want Ukraine to have clear rules that identify high-risk suppliers before potentially sensitive equipment becomes deeply embedded in national infrastructure.
Ukraine’s cybersecurity authorities have already created a broader mechanism for restricting prohibited software and communications equipment.
Under rules adopted after Cabinet Resolution No. 1335, products can be placed on an official public list when the relevant ownership or sanctions criteria are met, with restrictions taking effect once equipment is formally included.
The concern is whether that mechanism is sufficiently comprehensive and timely for 5G-specific national-security risks.
In other words, critics fear that waiting for equipment to become prohibited could be too late if a network operator has already selected and deployed it.
Ukraine has already taken steps toward tougher telecom oversight
The country is not starting from zero.
In February 2026, Ukraine adopted new rules governing spectrum tenders and auctions. The country’s parliament also highlighted legislation strengthening government oversight of mobile operators’ compliance with licence conditions during wartime.
Ukraine’s State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection, or SSSCIP, has simultaneously been strengthening cybersecurity controls and working with European institutions on critical-infrastructure protection.
The agency said in June that it was cooperating with the European Commission on regulatory measures intended to strengthen protection of critical infrastructure and align Ukrainian legislation with European standards.
Those efforts could eventually provide the foundation for stronger 5G security requirements.
But critics say the country needs those safeguards before major network investment decisions are locked in.
The war makes the issue more urgent
For Ukraine, 5G is not simply about faster downloads and better smartphone service.
Modern telecommunications networks are increasingly tied to critical infrastructure, government services, logistics, emergency communications, businesses and military-adjacent systems.
The country’s telecommunications operators have already demonstrated how strategically important connectivity has become during the war.
Kyivstar, Ukraine’s largest mobile operator, has acknowledged that it currently uses Huawei equipment in portions of its radio-access network. In a regulatory filing, the company warned that if Huawei, FiberHome or other Chinese-origin equipment were designated high-risk or prohibited in Ukraine, it could be forced to replace infrastructure at significant cost.
That disclosure illustrates the problem facing Ukraine’s future 5G network:
Once equipment is installed at scale, replacing it can become enormously expensive and disruptive.
Europe has already taken a harder line
Ukraine’s regulatory dilemma is occurring while the European Union continues pushing member states to reduce dependence on high-risk suppliers.
The EU’s 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox calls for risk assessments and measures addressing suppliers considered high-risk, particularly where factors such as foreign-state influence, legal obligations in the supplier’s home country and the supplier’s governance structure create security concerns.
Several European countries have consequently restricted or phased out Chinese equipment from sensitive portions of their telecom networks.
The United Kingdom, for example, legally required operators to remove Huawei equipment from its 5G networks, with the government setting an end-2027 deadline.
The United States has gone even further in recent years, expanding restrictions on Chinese telecommunications technology and financing programs designed to remove Huawei and ZTE equipment from American networks.
That leaves Ukraine facing a difficult strategic choice.
Cheaper equipment versus long-term security
Chinese telecom equipment can be attractive because of cost, established technology and the ability to provide large-scale network deployments.
But the economic advantage could come with a strategic price if equipment later has to be removed.
Ukraine is already dealing with enormous wartime infrastructure costs. Building a 5G network only to replace major components several years later would potentially mean paying twice.
That is why critics are pressing Kyiv to establish clear rules now rather than attempting to fix the problem after deployment.
Ukraine’s 5G rollout is also a signal to investors
The auction will be watched not only by telecom operators but also by equipment manufacturers and foreign investors.
A transparent system that clearly identifies security requirements could give international vendors greater certainty about what technology Ukraine will permit.
It could also strengthen Kyiv’s alignment with European digital-security standards as the country continues pursuing closer integration with the EU.
Ukraine’s challenge is therefore to build a 5G system that is both commercially viable and strategically trusted.
The clock is ticking
Ukraine has already created the legal machinery for spectrum auctions and continues to build a broader cybersecurity framework.
The unresolved question is whether its rules will be sufficiently explicit to prevent high-risk technology from becoming embedded in the network before authorities have the power—or the political will—to stop it.
For a country fighting a major war and seeking closer integration with Europe, the stakes go far beyond faster mobile internet.
Ukraine is about to decide who gets access to its 5G future—and the rules written before the auction could determine whether that future is built around trusted suppliers or technology Kyiv may later have to rip out.
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