Israel’s military footprint inside Syria is becoming increasingly difficult to describe as a short-term security measure.
Since the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s government in December 2024, Israeli forces have expanded operations in southern Syria, including deployments around the United Nations-monitored buffer zone near the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. What began as an Israeli effort to prevent potential threats from reaching its northern border has increasingly developed into a broader military strategy involving ground positions, patrols, raids and airstrikes.
The development is now creating a new and potentially dangerous triangle involving Israel, Syria and Turkey.
Recent events have shown just how quickly the Syrian theater can become a flashpoint between regional powers.
From border security to a deeper military footprint
The central issue is the area separating the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights from the rest of Syria.
The 1974 Israel-Syria Disengagement Agreement created a UN-monitored zone intended to separate the two militaries. The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, or UNDOF, continues to monitor the ceasefire arrangement.
But after Assad’s fall, Israel moved forces beyond the previous lines, arguing that the collapse of the Syrian government created a new security environment.
Israel has said its military presence is intended to prevent hostile armed groups from establishing positions near Israeli territory and to protect communities in northern Israel.
Analysts, however, increasingly describe the development as a shift toward a more permanent forward-defense or buffer-zone strategy.
The Atlantic Council has described Israel’s broader approach as emphasizing strategic depth and direct military control beyond its borders, while the Carnegie Endowment has reported that Israel has occupied additional territory in Syria and sought security arrangements extending beyond the existing buffer zone.
Quneitra has become a key pressure point
Much of the ground activity has centered on Syria’s southwestern Quneitra province, adjacent to the Golan Heights.
Israeli military incursions into the area have continued into 2026. In February, for example, reports described an Israeli convoy of roughly 30 military vehicles entering the eastern Tel al-Ahmar area near Ain Ziwan for a search operation.
The significance of Quneitra goes beyond individual raids.
The region provides commanding terrain overlooking parts of southern Syria and the Golan Heights, making control of strategic high ground particularly important to Israel’s military planners.
Research from ACLED says the Israeli deployment beyond the 1974 disengagement line has evolved into an expanded and fortified buffer zone, including military infrastructure and a strategic road network in the Quneitra countryside.
Israel’s concerns are not limited to Syria
One of the biggest changes in the equation is the growing role of Turkey.
Turkey has emerged as an important supporter of Syria’s post-Assad authorities and has expanded military and political cooperation with Damascus.
Israel increasingly views the possibility of a significant Turkish military presence in Syria as a strategic concern.
That concern became especially visible on August 18, when Israel struck the Abu al-Duhur airbase in northwestern Syria.
Israel said the attack was intended to prevent Syria from violating what it considers an emerging security understanding by allowing Turkish forces to establish a presence at the facility.
Turkey strongly rejected that justification and accused Israel of using the claim to legitimize an attack on Syrian territory. Reuters reported that Washington was subsequently working on a deconfliction mechanism involving Israel, Turkey and Syria to reduce the risk of a direct confrontation.
The United States has also expressed concern over the escalation.
According to Associated Press, U.S. special envoy Tom Barrack said Israel conducted the Abu al-Duhur strike without prior notification to Washington, while Israeli officials disputed that characterization and said intelligence had been shared.
Why does Israel want military depth inside Syria?
There are several overlapping reasons.
First is border security. Israel does not want armed groups operating close to the Golan Heights or northern Israeli communities.
Second is Iran and Hezbollah. Before Assad’s fall, Israel carried out extensive strikes in Syria aimed at disrupting Iranian military infrastructure and weapons transfers to Hezbollah. The Israeli campaign against Iranian entrenchment in Syria had been underway for years.
Third is the uncertainty surrounding Syria’s new political order. With Assad gone, Israel faces a government whose long-term military and political alignment remains uncertain.
Fourth is strategic geography. The hills and valleys of southwestern Syria provide important observation and defensive advantages.
But there is another increasingly important factor: Turkey’s growing influence.
That means Israel’s calculations in Syria are no longer simply about Iran or Syrian armed groups. Ankara’s relationship with Damascus is becoming an increasingly important part of Israel’s security planning.
The danger of a permanent buffer zone
The central question now is whether Israel’s military deployment will remain temporary—or become a long-term reality.
That distinction matters.
Israel has argued that its deployments are driven by security needs. Critics, including Syria and other regional governments, argue that continued military control of Syrian territory violates Syrian sovereignty and risks creating a permanent occupation.
A June analysis by Asharq Al-Awsat reported claims that Israeli forces had established multiple military positions and expanded their presence across parts of southern Syria since Assad’s ouster. Such figures should be treated cautiously because estimates of the territory and number of positions vary among sources.
The broader trend, however, is clear: Israeli military activity inside Syria has not disappeared after Assad’s fall. It has evolved.
A new Israel-Turkey confrontation?
The most immediate concern may be the possibility that Syria becomes the arena for an Israeli-Turkish confrontation.
The two countries are not formally at war, but their strategic interests increasingly collide inside Syria.
Turkey wants to strengthen the new Syrian government and maintain influence over its security architecture. Israel wants to prevent what it considers threatening military deployments near its territory.
The August airstrike demonstrated how quickly those competing interests can come into direct contact.
Turkey has condemned Israel’s actions, while Israel has warned against what it sees as an expanding Turkish military role in Syria. The United States is now attempting to establish mechanisms to prevent misunderstandings from turning into a wider conflict.
Syria is becoming the region’s next major fault line
The transformation underway in Syria is bigger than the question of where Israeli troops are positioned.
The country is emerging from years of civil war with a new political order, competing foreign powers and unresolved territorial questions.
Israel is attempting to create greater strategic distance from potential threats.
Turkey is seeking greater influence over Syria’s future.
Damascus wants to restore sovereignty over territory and rebuild its military and political institutions.
The United States is trying to prevent these competing agendas from producing a wider regional confrontation.
Meanwhile, UNDOF remains responsible for monitoring the fragile separation arrangement between Israel and Syria.
What happens next?
The most important question is no longer simply why Israel is increasing its military presence in Syria.
It is whether that presence becomes a permanent feature of the post-Assad Middle East.
If Israel continues building positions and expanding operations, Syria could see the emergence of a new long-term security frontier. If Turkey simultaneously expands its military role, the risk of miscalculation will increase.
And if diplomatic efforts fail, a conflict that began as a struggle over Syria’s post-Assad security architecture could eventually draw in Israel, Turkey, Syria and other regional powers.
For now, the United States is pushing for deconfliction rather than confrontation. But the recent strikes demonstrate how narrow the margin for error has become.
Syria is no longer simply recovering from a civil war. It is becoming the latest arena where the competing security strategies of the Middle East’s major powers are colliding.
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