SEOUL — For more than seven decades, South Korea’s core espionage law was largely built around one adversary: North Korea.
That changed on Sunday, Sept. 13.
A revised Criminal Act has now expanded South Korea’s espionage framework to cover spying conducted for any foreign country or an equivalent organization, closing a legal gap that had frustrated prosecutors handling cases involving semiconductor know-how, batteries, displays, artificial intelligence and other strategically important technologies.
The change may sound like a technical rewrite of criminal law. In practice, it could become an important new weapon in the global battle over some of the world’s most valuable technology.
South Korea is home to Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix, two companies sitting near the center of the global memory-chip and AI hardware supply chain. As competition for advanced semiconductor technology intensifies, Seoul increasingly sees the theft of industrial secrets not merely as a corporate problem, but as an issue of economic and national security.
The loophole South Korea had been trying to close
Under the old framework, prosecutors generally had to show that espionage benefited an “enemy state”, a term that South Korean courts effectively treated as referring to North Korea.
That created an obvious problem.
If sensitive technology was allegedly passed to a company, intermediary or organization connected to another country, authorities could pursue charges under trade-secret or industrial-technology laws — but not necessarily under the country’s main espionage provision.
The National Assembly approved the revision on Feb. 26, 2026. It was promulgated on March 12 and entered into force six months later, on Sept. 13.
The new Article 98-2 explicitly covers espionage undertaken for a foreign country or an equivalent organization.
South Korea’s official statute says a person who, under the direction, instigation or other communication of such a foreign entity, detects, collects, discloses, transmits or brokers national secrets — or assists such conduct — can receive at least three years in prison.
The older provision covering espionage for an enemy state remains separate and carries much tougher punishment, including life imprisonment and, under Korean law, the possibility of the death penalty.
Why chips are driving the urgency
This is not happening in a vacuum.
South Korea has spent years watching cases involving alleged leaks of semiconductor manufacturing techniques, display technology, batteries and other industrial know-how.
Police figures cited by Yonhap show that authorities detected 33 overseas technology-leak cases in 2025, up sharply from previous years. Of those, 18 — or 54.5 per cent — involved China. Semiconductors accounted for five of the overseas cases, followed by displays, secondary batteries and shipbuilding technologies.
Those numbers matter because South Korea’s competitiveness is unusually dependent on technology-heavy exports.
Samsung and SK Hynix are among the world’s dominant memory-chip producers, while Korean companies also hold major positions in batteries, displays, shipbuilding and defense manufacturing.
That means a stolen process recipe, manufacturing technique or production document can potentially represent years of research and billions of dollars of investment.
The Financial Times reported that Seoul’s concerns have increasingly centered on attempts to recruit experienced Korean engineers, including former employees with detailed knowledge of sensitive production processes.
Samsung case put the stakes in stark relief
One of the highest-profile cases behind the debate involved former Samsung Electronics employees.
Reuters reported that five former Samsung workers were indicted over allegations that key DRAM memory-chip technology had been transferred to Chinese memory-chip maker CXMT.
Samsung and CXMT did not comment on those allegations at the time.
That distinction matters: the case involved accusations and legal proceedings, not a blanket finding that a foreign company or government orchestrated espionage.
The revised law is likewise not written specifically against China.
Its wording applies to foreign countries and comparable organizations generally. When asked whether the change could be seen as targeting Beijing, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said China expects companies to conduct international cooperation according to laws and international rules, while calling for a fair and non-discriminatory business environment.
Still, China looms large in the debate because of the scale of technology competition between the two countries and the proportion of Korean overseas-leak investigations that have involved China.
Another chip leak case ended with prison time
The concerns are not limited to Samsung.
In August, a South Korean appeals court upheld an 18-month prison sentence for a former SK Hynix employee convicted of leaking confidential semiconductor-related information to a Chinese company.
The material concerned technology used in CMOS image sensors. According to Reuters, the employee had accessed sensitive internal documents and disclosed some information while applying for work at the Chinese firm.
That case was handled under existing laws because the events predated the new espionage provision.
Under the expanded framework, comparable future cases could potentially expose suspects to espionage charges as well — provided prosecutors can establish all the legal elements required under Article 98-2.
The law goes beyond semiconductor companies
The National Intelligence Service welcomed the revision when it passed, saying it would strengthen South Korea’s ability to protect strategic technologies including semiconductors, displays, batteries and artificial intelligence.
Seoul has also been strengthening other parts of its technology-security system.
In 2026, the government established a dedicated investigative structure for advanced-technology leaks, with special judicial police focusing on areas including semiconductors and AI. Korea’s Ministry of Intellectual Property said its technology-policing operation was being expanded to 61 officers.
South Korea separately maintains legislation governing the export and foreign transfer of designated national strategic technologies, including requirements for government approval in certain cases.
And a semiconductor-specific law that took effect in August explicitly frames the chip industry as central to South Korea’s economic and national security.
Taken together, the measures show a broader policy shift: advanced technology is increasingly being treated like strategic infrastructure.
But the new law creates another problem: how broad is a “national secret”?
Not everyone is comfortable with the expansion.
South Korea’s defense industry has raised concerns that the wording could create uncertainty for companies whose ordinary business involves sharing sensitive information with foreign governments and overseas partners.
Korea JoongAng Daily reported that defense firms are particularly concerned about what exactly qualifies as a “national secret” and when an overseas buyer, partner or company could be considered a foreign-country equivalent organization.
That is not a minor question.
South Korean defense exports increasingly involve more than simply shipping completed weapons overseas. Modern contracts can include design information, software, maintenance data, technology transfer, local manufacturing and training.
Companies fear that poorly defined boundaries could expose legitimate international business to criminal disputes.
The law does contain an important limiting element: prosecutors must establish a connection such as direction, instigation or other communication with the foreign entity, rather than merely showing that information ended up abroad.
That threshold could become one of the most closely watched parts of future prosecutions.
The numbers explain why Seoul is willing to take the risk
The potential economic damage from technology leakage is enormous.
Korea JoongAng Daily cited figures showing 110 cases of industrial technology being leaked overseas between 2020 and the first half of 2025.
Thirty-three involved technologies officially classified as national core technologies, with estimated industrial damage reaching about 23.27 trillion won, or roughly US$15.7 billion at the conversion cited by the publication.
In 2025 alone, Korean police detected 179 technology-leak cases overall — 146 domestic cases and 33 involving overseas transfers.
Those figures help explain why the debate has moved beyond ordinary intellectual-property enforcement.
For policymakers in Seoul, losing advanced chip or battery technology could shorten a foreign competitor’s development cycle, reduce the advantage of Korean manufacturers and weaken industries responsible for major shares of the country’s exports.
Smaller firms may be even more exposed
Much of the public attention focuses on Samsung and SK Hynix, but smaller suppliers may face an even greater security problem.
South Korea’s semiconductor ecosystem includes hundreds of companies supplying equipment, chemicals, packaging technology, software and specialist manufacturing processes.
Unlike global conglomerates, smaller companies may have fewer resources for cybersecurity, employee monitoring and post-employment restrictions.
The Financial Times reported that small and medium-sized companies accounted for a large majority of recently identified technology-leak cases examined by Korean authorities.
That creates a vulnerability across the supply chain: an attacker may not need to penetrate Samsung itself if a supplier possesses valuable process information.
This is part of a much bigger global technology war
South Korea is hardly alone.
Governments around the world increasingly treat semiconductors, artificial intelligence, advanced batteries, quantum technology and defense systems as national-security assets.
The United States has tightened chip-export restrictions and economic-espionage enforcement. China has expanded its counterespionage regime. Britain has strengthened national-security legislation governing foreign interference and sensitive technology.
Korea JoongAng Daily noted that the South Korean revision places Seoul within this broader international trend of treating technology and supply chains as security concerns rather than ordinary commercial matters.
That transformation has accelerated because of AI.
High-bandwidth memory, or HBM — a sector in which SK Hynix and Samsung are major players — is now a critical component of powerful AI accelerators.
As demand for AI computing rises, control over the manufacturing knowledge behind advanced memory has become strategically valuable.
That makes industrial secrets increasingly difficult to separate from national power.
South Korea’s message has now changed
For decades, South Korea’s espionage laws reflected the Cold War security problem on the Korean Peninsula.
The biggest threat imagined by the statute was a spy working for North Korea.
The new law acknowledges a very different world.
A damaging secret may no longer involve troop positions or military plans. It could be a semiconductor manufacturing process, an AI system, a battery chemistry formula, a display technology or a piece of industrial equipment that determines who dominates a strategically important global market.
And the person trying to obtain it may not fit the traditional image of a spy.
They could be a corporate recruiter, an intermediary, a former engineer — or someone operating through a foreign company.
That is why South Korea’s Sept. 13 change could prove far more consequential than its dry legal language suggests.
The country’s newest espionage battlefield may not be along the demilitarized zone at all. It could be inside a semiconductor laboratory.
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