TAIPEI — China is reportedly slowing shipments of strategically important metals to Taiwan, adding a new layer of pressure to one of the world’s most important technology supply chains and raising questions over whether critical minerals could become Beijing’s next major point of leverage.
According to an exclusive report by Nikkei Asia, Taiwanese companies are facing longer waits and greater uncertainty in obtaining some China-sourced specialty materials used in advanced optical equipment, electronics and aerospace applications.
The development matters far beyond Taiwan.
Taiwan sits at the center of global semiconductor production and hosts manufacturers whose components eventually flow into everything from artificial-intelligence servers and smartphones to communications systems, industrial equipment and defense technologies.
That means even a relatively small disruption in specialized raw materials can eventually ripple through much larger global supply chains.
China’s Critical-Mineral Controls Have Been Expanding for Years
The reported slowdown is not happening in isolation.
Beijing has progressively expanded export controls on critical minerals as technology tensions with the United States and its allies have intensified.
China began requiring licenses for exports of gallium and germanium-related products in August 2023, saying the measures were necessary to protect national security and interests. China’s official export-control notice covers metallic gallium and germanium as well as a range of semiconductor compounds.
The restrictions were later broadened.
In February 2025, China imposed controls covering strategic materials including tungsten, tellurium, bismuth, molybdenum and indium, with exporters required to apply for government permission before shipping covered products abroad.
Then in April 2025, Beijing introduced controls on several medium and heavy rare-earth elements, including samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium and yttrium.
Taken together, the measures have created what manufacturers increasingly see as a licensing bottleneck rather than a simple commodity shortage.
The difference is important.
China does not necessarily have to announce a complete export ban to cause disruption. Longer approval times, tighter documentation requirements, end-user reviews and uncertainty over whether a license will be granted can force buyers to build inventories, seek alternative suppliers or redesign supply chains.
Why Germanium and Gallium Matter
Two metals that have attracted particular attention are germanium and gallium.
Germanium is widely used in fiber-optic systems, infrared optics, night-vision technologies and advanced electronics.
Gallium is critical for compound semiconductors used in LEDs, telecommunications equipment, high-frequency electronics and advanced power devices.
The U.S. Geological Survey has identified gallium as important for integrated circuits and optical devices, while germanium has major applications in fiber optics and night-vision equipment.
European Commission analysis published in 2026 similarly highlighted germanium’s importance to infrared optics, optical fibers and satellite solar cells, while gallium-based semiconductors such as gallium arsenide and gallium nitride are important in radio-frequency electronics, telecommunications and power systems.
That combination makes these materials particularly sensitive in the Taiwan context.
Taiwan is not simply producing consumer electronics. Its manufacturing ecosystem supports advanced computing, networking, optical communications and increasingly defense-related technologies.
The Bigger Risk May Be Delay, Not Complete Cutoff
For manufacturers, the biggest immediate danger may not be that Chinese metals disappear entirely.
It may be that supplies become slower, less predictable and more expensive.
Export licensing creates uncertainty because companies cannot always know when approvals will arrive or whether regulators may ask for additional information about customers and end uses.
That can increase working-capital requirements as companies stockpile material and can force firms to qualify alternative suppliers before shortages become severe.
The effects are already visible elsewhere.
China’s restrictions on strategic minerals have contributed to tighter international supplies and sharper differences between domestic Chinese and overseas prices.
Supply-chain analysts have also increasingly warned that China’s dominance in processing some of these materials gives Beijing leverage extending far beyond mining itself.
The vulnerability is especially significant for advanced manufacturing because many critical metals are used in tiny quantities but perform functions that are difficult to replace quickly.
A factory may need only a modest amount of germanium or gallium compared with steel or copper — but without it, a highly specialized optical or electronic component may still be impossible to manufacture.
Taiwan Has Already Been Preparing for Critical-Mineral Risk
Taiwan’s government has been publicly monitoring China’s expanding mineral-export restrictions.
Following Beijing’s expansion of rare-earth controls in 2025, Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs said many rare-earth-related products needed by its semiconductor sector were sourced primarily from Europe, the United States and Japan, limiting the immediate direct effect on chip production.
However, the ministry acknowledged that broader export restrictions could cause longer procurement times and rising prices and said it would continue promoting alternative sourcing, recycling and international cooperation to strengthen supply-chain resilience.
The distinction is crucial.
Taiwan may not be completely dependent on China for every controlled material, but Chinese restrictions can still influence worldwide availability and pricing because global supply chains are interconnected.
Even companies sourcing from suppliers outside China may face higher prices when buyers around the world begin competing for the same alternative sources.
Taiwan’s Semiconductor Industry Raises the Stakes
Any sustained disruption affecting Taiwan inevitably carries wider implications because of the island’s extraordinary role in advanced electronics.
Taiwanese companies manufacture many of the world’s most sophisticated semiconductors and operate deep supplier networks spanning chemicals, materials, precision machinery, packaging, optical components and electronic hardware.
That means restrictions targeting materials that appear relatively obscure can eventually reach major downstream industries.
AI servers, telecommunications equipment, data centers, smartphones, vehicles and defense systems all depend on complicated networks of specialty components.
A shortage does not need to hit the semiconductor wafer itself to become significant.
A disruption affecting an optical sensor, specialty coating, infrared component, satellite material or precision manufacturing tool can create another bottleneck somewhere else in the chain.
Critical Minerals Are Becoming Part of the Technology War
For years, the U.S.-China technology conflict largely focused on semiconductors and the machines used to manufacture them.
Washington restricted China’s access to advanced processors and semiconductor-production technology.
China increasingly responded from another direction: raw materials.
Beijing controls a powerful position in the mining, refining or processing of numerous strategic minerals, giving it an area of economic leverage that many technology-importing countries cannot easily replicate.
That has pushed the United States, Japan, Europe and other economies to accelerate recycling projects, alternative mining developments and strategic stockpiles.
Yet replacing China’s processing capacity can take years.
New mines require regulatory approval.
Refineries require significant capital.
And manufacturers must often spend additional time testing and qualifying new suppliers before their materials can be used in sensitive electronic or aerospace applications.
Could Taiwan Become the Next Pressure Point?
That is now the question hanging over the latest reported shipment slowdown.
There is an important distinction between formal export controls that apply internationally and a deliberate attempt to restrict Taiwan specifically.
The available public evidence confirms that China has imposed increasingly extensive licensing regimes for strategic materials.
But proving that every shipment delay represents an intentional Taiwan-specific embargo would require stronger evidence than shipment delays alone.
That makes the situation more complicated — and potentially more difficult for companies to manage.
A formal ban is easy to identify.
A licensing system that continues allowing some shipments while slowing others can create persistent uncertainty without ever producing a single dramatic announcement.
For Taiwan, that may be the more consequential scenario.
Its technology sector can diversify suppliers, increase inventories and invest in recycling.
But every additional layer of uncertainty adds cost.
And if strategic minerals increasingly become bargaining tools in the geopolitical struggle over semiconductors, companies may soon have to treat access to raw materials with the same urgency they already apply to advanced chips and chipmaking equipment.
The battle over the global semiconductor supply chain may no longer be only about who can manufacture the world’s most advanced chips.
It may increasingly depend on who controls the obscure metals needed to make the technologies surrounding them possible.
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