MANILA, Philippines — After more than two decades of negotiations, China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have made substantial progress toward a long-awaited agreement aimed at preventing confrontations in the South China Sea. But despite reportedly resolving around 80% of the proposed text, the parties will miss their goal of completing the deal by the end of 2026.
The remaining disagreements involve some of the most sensitive questions in the maritime dispute: which waters the agreement will cover, how important provisions will be defined, and whether the final Code of Conduct will be legally binding.
The development is a diplomatic setback for the Philippines, which has made completing the agreement a major priority during its 2026 ASEAN chairmanship.
Three senior Southeast Asian diplomats familiar with the negotiations told The Associated Press that negotiators had provisionally agreed on approximately 80% of the proposed text following the latest round of discussions in October. They spoke anonymously because they were not authorized to disclose details publicly.
The figure is significant, but it does not mean that the most difficult issues have been settled.
Negotiations are expected to continue in 2027, when Singapore takes over the rotating ASEAN chairmanship.
For the Philippines, the delay raises a critical question: Can regional governments establish meaningful rules for the disputed waters before another confrontation between Chinese and Philippine vessels escalates?
80% of the South China Sea Agreement Is Reportedly Settled — But the Hardest Issues Remain
The proposed South China Sea Code of Conduct, commonly known as the COC, is intended to establish rules and expectations for how countries behave in the disputed waterway.
Its broader objective is to encourage restraint, reduce misunderstandings and prevent encounters involving military, coast guard and civilian vessels from turning into a larger conflict.
According to the three diplomats cited by AP, approximately 80% of the proposed agreement’s paragraphs have been provisionally agreed upon.
However, the remaining 20% contains several politically sensitive issues that could determine whether the agreement becomes an effective regional framework or a largely symbolic diplomatic commitment.
The unresolved issues include:
- Geographical scope: Which specific maritime areas will be covered by the agreement?
- Definitions of sensitive terms: How will important provisions and obligations be interpreted?
- Legal enforceability: Will the Code of Conduct be legally binding, or will it primarily function as a political commitment?
These questions are particularly important for the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei, which have overlapping maritime claims or interests in the South China Sea.
A code that encourages peaceful behavior but lacks clear obligations could have limited influence when countries disagree over what actions are permitted.
The 80% figure therefore represents progress in drafting, not proof that the parties have reached a final political or legal agreement.
Why the Philippines Wanted the Deal Completed Before 2026 Ends
The Philippines has pushed to accelerate negotiations while serving as ASEAN chair in 2026.
Foreign Affairs Secretary Ma. Theresa Lazaro previously expressed confidence that the agreement could be completed before the end of the year.
During the 59th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Manila in July, Lazaro said negotiations had been taking place monthly since January, reflecting stronger political commitment among participating governments.
She also identified several important areas of discussion, including self-restraint, geographical coverage, the legal nature of the proposed code and its relationship with existing international agreements.
The Philippine government has consistently argued that the COC must be consistent with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
It also wants the agreement to respect the rights of countries that are not directly involved in the negotiations.
In July, the Philippine Presidential Communications Office reported that Lazaro considered the growing consensus on self-restraint a positive development. She also emphasized that the proposed agreement should provide rules governing conduct and behavior at sea.
The missed deadline is therefore a setback for Manila’s diplomatic timetable, although it does not mean negotiations have collapsed.
The discussions are expected to continue under Singapore’s ASEAN leadership in 2027.
China and Malaysia Led at Least 10 Major Negotiating Rounds
China and Malaysia jointly led at least 10 major negotiating rounds this year, according to the diplomats cited by AP.
Their participation highlights the importance of cooperation between Beijing and ASEAN members in moving the agreement forward.
However, ASEAN is not a single claimant with identical territorial interests.
The Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei have overlapping claims or maritime interests in the South China Sea. China maintains extensive claims across the waterway, while Taiwan also has its own claims.
Indonesia, although not generally considered a claimant to the Spratly Islands dispute, has maritime interests around the Natuna Islands that have brought it into disagreements with Chinese fishing and government vessels.
Each government must balance its territorial and maritime positions, economic interests, national security concerns and diplomatic relationships.
That makes reaching agreement on broad principles easier than accepting provisions that could restrict a country’s future actions.
The challenge is not simply to finish writing the document. It is to produce a text that governments are willing to follow when a confrontation actually occurs.
The South China Sea Dispute Is More Than a Territorial Disagreement
The South China Sea is one of the world’s most important maritime trade routes.
It connects major Asian economies with international markets and carries substantial commercial shipping traffic, including energy shipments and other essential goods.
The waterway is also important for fishing, offshore resources and regional economic activity.
A serious confrontation could disrupt shipping, raise insurance costs and affect supply chains far beyond Southeast Asia.
The dispute has also become a sensitive part of the broader rivalry between the United States and China.
Washington has repeatedly stated that its Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines applies to armed attacks against Philippine armed forces, public vessels or aircraft, including those of its coast guard, in the South China Sea.
Beijing, meanwhile, has warned Washington against becoming involved in what it describes as a regional dispute.
This creates another complication for ASEAN negotiators.
A maritime incident involving China and the Philippines could attract international attention and increase pressure on other governments to take positions.
The proposed COC is intended to reduce the risk of such incidents escalating, but its effectiveness will depend on the commitments that countries ultimately accept.
The 2016 South China Sea Arbitration Ruling Remains a Major Issue
The negotiations are also taking place against the background of the landmark arbitration ruling issued on July 12, 2016.
The tribunal constituted under UNCLOS rejected China’s claimed historic rights to resources within the so-called nine-dash line insofar as those claims exceeded the maritime entitlements permitted under international law.
The ruling also clarified important maritime entitlements and addressed the Philippines’ rights within its exclusive economic zone.
China rejected the ruling and continues to dispute its conclusions.
The proposed Code of Conduct is not intended to replace the arbitration award or settle every sovereignty disagreement involving islands, reefs and maritime features.
Instead, it is designed to establish practical expectations for conduct and reduce the risk of confrontations.
This distinction matters.
Even if China and ASEAN eventually sign the agreement, it would not automatically determine sovereignty over every disputed island or establish a final maritime boundary.
The underlying legal and territorial disagreements would remain.
For more context on the legal and diplomatic dispute, WWC ONE MEDIA previously examined Manila’s position on Chinese construction and activities around two contested reefs:
Maritime Confrontations Continue While Negotiators Work on the Agreement
The urgency of the negotiations is reinforced by continuing maritime tensions.
The Philippines and China have repeatedly exchanged accusations involving coast guard vessels, naval forces and Philippine resupply operations.
In September 2026, the Philippine Coast Guard accused Chinese vessels of obstructing a resupply mission to Filipino personnel aboard the grounded BRP Sierra Madre at Second Thomas Shoal, also known as Ayungin Shoal.
According to the Philippine Coast Guard, dangerous maneuvers created a serious risk of collision and prevented the mission from being completed.
The Chinese embassy in Manila did not immediately respond to a request for comment at the time of the report.
The incident followed other confrontations in the disputed waters, including encounters near Scarborough Shoal.
China has also continued military and coast guard activity around contested maritime features.
In September, the People’s Liberation Army Southern Theater Command conducted naval and air exercises around Scarborough Shoal. Chinese authorities described the operations as activities to protect what Beijing considers its territorial sovereignty and maritime interests.
The Philippines disputes China’s claims and maintains that its maritime rights must be respected under international law.
WWC ONE MEDIA previously reported on the September exercises and their implications for the Philippines:
China Holds Naval and Air Drills Around Disputed Scarborough Shoal in South China Sea.
These developments illustrate the gap between diplomatic negotiations and the realities at sea.
While officials work toward a common agreement, vessels from countries with competing claims continue operating in close proximity.
Could a Weak Code of Conduct Leave the Philippines Exposed?
The question is not simply whether the agreement will be signed.
Its actual provisions will determine whether it can make a meaningful difference.
Analysts have previously warned that a weak or overly general agreement could become largely symbolic.
A code that lacks clear obligations, practical crisis-management procedures or credible implementation mechanisms may not prevent dangerous encounters.
The legal status of the document is particularly important.
A legally binding agreement could establish stronger obligations for participating governments, although its practical effectiveness would still depend on implementation and compliance.
A non-binding political commitment could encourage cooperation but may offer fewer legal mechanisms when a country is accused of violating its provisions.
For the Philippines, accepting an agreement that does not adequately protect its maritime interests could create the appearance of diplomatic progress without resolving the underlying problems.
China, meanwhile, may resist provisions that it believes would restrict its freedom of action or involve outside powers in regional disputes.
This is why the remaining negotiations could prove more difficult than the reported 80% progress suggests.
The Philippines Must Balance Diplomacy With Maritime Defense
The delay also highlights the difficult position facing Manila.
The government wants to maintain diplomatic engagement with Beijing while protecting Philippine maritime rights, fishing communities and national security.
These objectives do not necessarily conflict.
The Philippines can continue negotiating while strengthening maritime surveillance, improving defense capabilities and invoking international law when necessary.
On November 10, Armed Forces of the Philippines spokesperson for the West Philippine Sea Rear Admiral Roy Vincent Trinidad defended the country’s position, saying that protecting Philippine maritime rights should not be confused with provoking conflict.
His remarks came amid public debate over whether Manila should adopt a more cautious diplomatic approach toward Beijing.
WWC ONE MEDIA reported on that exchange and the government’s challenge of defending maritime rights without allowing tensions to escalate:
For Filipino communities dependent on the sea, the issue has direct consequences.
Fishing access, maritime safety, food security and the protection of economic resources are all connected to the outcome of the dispute.
A diplomatic agreement could help reduce risks, but it cannot replace the need to protect the country’s maritime interests.
What Happens Next Under Singapore’s ASEAN Leadership?
The negotiations are expected to continue in 2027, when Singapore takes over the rotating ASEAN chairmanship.
The Philippines’ 2026 leadership helped increase the frequency of discussions, but the next chair will inherit the remaining disagreements.
The upcoming ASEAN summit in Manila is expected to give regional leaders an opportunity to discuss the delayed agreement alongside continuing maritime incidents and broader regional security concerns.
The next phase of negotiations will need to address several questions:
- Can China and ASEAN agree on the geographical scope of the proposed code?
- Will the final document contain legally binding commitments?
- Can negotiators establish clear definitions and practical rules for maritime conduct?
- Will the agreement respect international law, including UNCLOS?
- Can the participating governments agree on provisions that are meaningful enough to prevent dangerous encounters?
The answers will determine whether the COC becomes a practical regional framework or another diplomatic document with limited influence over events at sea.
The Bigger Question: Can ASEAN and China Agree Before Another Maritime Crisis?
The reported 80% progress is an important development after years of negotiations.
But missing the 2026 deadline demonstrates that the most politically sensitive issues remain unresolved.
For the Philippines, the delay is a reminder that diplomatic momentum does not automatically translate into stronger protection of its maritime interests.
For China and ASEAN, the challenge is to turn years of negotiations into commitments that can make a difference when ships from competing claimants encounter one another.
The region cannot measure success simply by the number of paragraphs completed.
The real test will be whether the final agreement can help prevent the next confrontation from becoming a wider crisis.
China and ASEAN may have agreed on most of the proposed text, but the remaining disputes concern the very rules that could determine how countries behave in contested waters. Will Singapore’s 2027 ASEAN leadership finally deliver a meaningful Code of Conduct — or will another maritime confrontation expose how much remains unresolved?
